張陽a,徐子慧a,王曉丹(dan)b.審計師會收取並(bing)購(gou)商譽風(feng)險溢價嗎?——基于代(dai)理成(cheng)本(ben)和經營風(feng)險視角[J].南京審計學院學報(bao),2021,(2):
審計師會收取並(bing)購(gou)商譽風(feng)險溢價嗎?——基于代(dai)理成(cheng)本(ben)和經營風(feng)險視角
  
DOI︰
中文關(guan)鍵詞(ci):  審計費(fei)用  並(bing)購(gou)  商譽  代(dai)理成(cheng)本(ben)  經營風(feng)險  企業di)導(dao)/u>  盈余管(guan)理  風(feng)險溢價
英文關(guan)鍵詞(ci):audit fees  mergers and acquisitions  goodwill  agency cost  operating risk  enterprise performance  earnings management  risk premium
基金項目:國家自然科學基金項目(71172224)
作者單(dan)位
張陽a,徐子慧a,王曉丹(dan)b 廣(guang)東(dong)財(cai)經大(da)學 a.會計學院b.經濟學院廣(guang)東(dong) 廣(guang)州 510320 
摘要點(dian)擊次(ci)數: 146
全文下載次(ci)數: 178
中文摘要:
      並(bing)購(gou)是企業di)岣gao)競爭力的(de)重要手段(duan),但(dan)近期並(bing)購(gou)商譽中對(dui)未chun)叢(cong)?詰de)風(feng)險暴(bao)露dui) 時ben)市場(chang)震動(dong)。以2008—2018年中國A股(gu)上市公(gong)司為研究樣本(ben),實di)?fen)析並(bing)購(gou)商譽對(dui)審計費(fei)用的(de)影ba) Q芯拷 biao)明︰並(bing)購(gou)商譽與審計費(fei)用正相關(guan),即ci)蠹剖δ芄gou)成(cheng)功(gong)識dong)bie)商譽風(feng)險並(bing)在審計費(fei)用上加以反(fan)cong)Γ 逑殖chu)審計制度(du)的(de)有效性。通過作用機制檢驗發(fa)現,代(dai)理成(cheng)本(ben)和經營風(feng)險在並(bing)購(gou)商譽對(dui)審計費(fei)用的(de)影ba) 蟹fa)揮了部(bu)分(fen)中介作用。進一步(bu)考慮外部(bu)監督(du)的(de)調(diao)節效應,發(fa)現機構(gou)投dun)收唚艿diao)節代(dai)理成(cheng)本(ben)和經營風(feng)險的(de)中介效應。
英文摘要:
      Mergers and acquisitions are an important means for companies to improve their competitiveness. However, the expected risk exposure of future goodwill in recent mergers and acquisitions has caused shocks in the capital market. Using Chinese A-share listed companies from 2008 to 2018 as a research sample, this paper empirically analyzes the impact of M&A goodwill on audit fees. The research results show that M&A goodwill is positively correlated with audit fees, that is, auditors can successfully identify goodwill risks and react to audit fees, which reflects the effectiveness of the audit system. Through the inspection of the mechanism of action, it is found that agency costs and operating risks play a part of the intermediary role in the influence of M&A goodwill on audit fees. Further considering the moderating effect of external supervision, this paper finds that institutional investors can adjust the mediating effect of agency costs and operating risks.
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