崔(cui)健波(bo)1,羅正英2.外部(bu)經理人市場(chang)、信息租與成(cheng)本(ben)控制效率[J].南京審計學院學報(bao),2021,(2):
外部(bu)經理人市場(chang)、信息租與成(cheng)本(ben)控制效率
  
DOI︰
中文關(guan)鍵詞(ci):  成(cheng)本(ben)控制  棘輪效應  外部(bu)經理人市場(chang)  信息租  承諾dao)?/u>  國企總部(bu)  生產單(dan)元管(guan)理者  貝(bei)葉duan)咕(gu)/u>
英文關(guan)鍵詞(ci):cost control  ratchet effect  external managerial labor market  information rent  incentive to commitment  headquarters of state-owned enterprises  manager of manufacturing units  Bayesian equilibrium
基金項目:江甦省社會科學基金一般(ban)項目(19GLB004)
作者單(dan)位
崔(cui)健波(bo)1,羅正英2 1.江甦科技大(da)學 經濟管(guan)理學院江甦 鎮江 2120032.甦州大(da)學 東(dong)吳商學院江甦 甦州 215006 
摘要點(dian)擊次(ci)數: 122
全文下載次(ci)數: 156
中文摘要:
      利用委托人(國企總部(bu))和代(dai)理人(生產單(dan)元管(guan)理者)對(dui)于後者成(cheng)本(ben)控制能力信息的(de)不(bu)對(dui)稱(chen),優秀管(guan)理者在當(dang)bi)誥陀卸dong)機付(fu)dong)chu)低(di)努力、冒an)淦脹 guan)理者,以規(gui)避(bi)下期更(geng)為苛刻的(de)成(cheng)本(ben)控制業dao)ㄒ 螅 錄 中?ΑN 種聘gai)效應,從(cong)而(er)實di)殖cheng)本(ben)控制高(gao)效率,委托人需識dong)bie)管(guan)理者類型,卻cong)置媼俑gao)額(e)信息租。考慮兩期有(無)跨期承諾dao)?fang)案fu) 扇臚獠bu)經理人市場(chang)影ba)煲蛩兀  笞懿bu)與生產單(dan)元之間的(de)博(bo)弈均衡模型化為一個(ge)完美貝(bei)葉duan)咕(gu)狻9gou)建動(dong)態逆向選擇模型,設計最優激勵方(fang)案fu) 教質迪(di)址fen)離均衡時bao) ?guan)理者付(fu)dong)chu)高(gao)努力的(de)條件和信息租。研究發(fa)現,民企對(dui)國企人才(cai)的(de)競爭,弱化了棘輪效應,信息租降dang)汀/span>
英文摘要:
      By using the asymmetric information about the ability of the principal (headquarters of state-owned enterprises) and the agent (managers of manufacturing units) on the latter’s cost control, the excellent managers have the motivation to make low efforts in the current period and pretend to be ordinary managers, so as to avoid the more stringent performance requirements of cost control in the next period, which leads to the ratchet effect. In order to restrain this effect and achieve high efficiency of cost control, the principal needs to identy the type of managers, but faces high information rent. Considering two-period incentive scheme with(without) intertemporal promise and the interfering factors of external managerial labor market, the game between headquarters and manufacturing units is modeled to be perfect Bayesian equilibrium. This study constructs a dynamic adverse selection model and designs optimal incentive schemes to discuss condition and information rent that will motivate managers exerting high effort under separating equilibrium. Research result shows that the competition between private enterprises and state-owned enterprises for talents weakens the ratchet effect and reduces the information rent.
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