馬亞紅.交易所年報(bao)問詢能提升上市公(gong)司盈余質量嗎?——基于深交所數據的(de)實di)?fen)析[J].南京審計學院學報(bao),2021,(2):
交易所年報(bao)問詢能提升上市公(gong)司盈余質量嗎?——基于深交所數據的(de)實di)?fen)析
  
DOI︰
中文關(guan)鍵詞(ci):  年報(bao)問詢函  盈余質量  信息披露du)喙guan)  盈余管(guan)理  年報(bao)審核  證券市場(chang)監管(guan)  年度(du)報(bao)告(gao)
英文關(guan)鍵詞(ci):annual report inquiry letter  earnings quality  information disclosure supervision  earnings management  reviewing of annual report  supervision of stock market  annual report
基金項目:甘(gan)肅省高(gao)等(deng)學校科研項目(2020B-147)
作者單(dan)位
馬亞紅 蘭州財(cai)經大(da)學 會計學院甘(gan)肅 蘭州 730020 
摘要點(dian)擊次(ci)數: 121
全文下載次(ci)數: 156
中文摘要:
      在上市公(gong)司公(gong)告(gao)年報(bao)後,交易所會組織專業deng)嗽倍(bei)閱甌bao)進行審核,並(bing)針對(dui)可能的(de)疑問向上市公(gong)司發(fa)放(fang)年報(bao)問詢函,要求公(gong)司回復(fu)chuang)bing)公(gong)開披露ding);謖庖恢貧du)背(bei)景ai) 隕 凰股(gu)上市公(gong)司為研究對(dui)象,針對(dui)2014年至2017年間年報(bao)被(bei)問詢的(de)上市公(gong)司進行研究,發(fa)現在控制其他因素後,當(dang)beng)甓du)年報(bao)被(bei)交易所問詢的(de)公(gong)司,其盈余管(guan)理程度(du)更(geng)高(gao)、盈余質量更(geng)差(cha),表(biao)明交易所在年報(bao)審核中是有的(de)放(fang)矢fu)de),關(guan)注到(dao)此(ci)類盈余質量更(geng)差(cha)的(de)公(gong)司;同時bei) 鄭 鋅毓gu)公(gong)司被(bei)問詢的(de)可能性低(di)于非(fei)國有控股(gu)公(gong)司,表(biao)明交易所在年報(bao)問詢中可能存(cun)在偏倚現象;進一步(bu)檢驗發(fa)現在年報(bao)被(bei)問詢後,公(gong)司次(ci)年的(de)盈余管(guan)理程度(du)依然較高(gao),盈余質量並(bing)未chui)玫dao)改(gai)善,年報(bao)問詢這一非(fei)處(chu)罰(fa)性監管(guan)措(cuo)施在改(gai)善盈余質量方(fang)面的(de)監管(guan)效果有限。
英文摘要:
      After the listed company discloses the annual report, the exchange will organize professionals to review the annual report, and issue an annual report inquiry letter to the listed company for possible questions, requesting the company to reply and publicly disclose. Based on this institutional background, this paper takes the A-share listed companies of Shenzhen Stock Exchange as the research object, and studies the listed companies whose annual reports were inquired from 2014 to 2017.The research finds that after controlling other factors, when the annual report is inquired by the exchange, the company has a higher degree of earnings management and a worsening earnings quality, which indicates that the exchange is targeted in the annual report review, focusing on companies with poorer earnings quality.It is also found the possibility of state-controlled listed companies being questioned is lower than non-state-owned holdings companies, indicating that there is a bias in the annual report inquiry of the exchange. Further test shows that after the annual report is inquired,the level of earnings management of the company in the next year is still high, and earnings quality has not been improved. The regulatory effect of annual report inquiry, a non punitive regulatory measure, is limited in improving earnings quality.
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